MCP Server Security

MCP Security Checklist

The MCP Security Checklist has 42 steps in six stages: discover, vet, authenticate, constrain, observe and respond. Each is a concrete action with why it matters, how to do it, a priority from one written rule (31 high, 11 medium, 0 low) and the risk identifiers it closes, with sources read on 16 Nov 2026.

Facts read on .

All 42 items

MCP Security Checklist: 42 items
IDItemCategorySeverity
C-01List every MCP client in useDiscoverhigh
C-02Collect MCP configuration files from machinesDiscoverhigh
C-03Record how each server is launchedDiscoverhigh
C-04Turn on endpoint discovery of configured serversDiscoverhigh
C-05Find remote and HTTP MCP endpoints on your networkDiscoverhigh
C-06Assign an owner and review date to each serverDiscoverhigh
C-07Compare the inventory with the approved catalog on a scheduleDiscoverhigh
C-08Verify the publisher and the exact package nameVethigh
C-09Diff the code against the upstream projectVethigh
C-10Review every field of each tool definitionVethigh
C-11Scan the server's dependenciesVetmedium
C-12Check the SDK version against current advisoriesVethigh
C-13Test the server in a sandbox with network captureVethigh
C-14Review the launch manifest and environment variablesVethigh
C-15Record the decision and pin the approved versionVetmedium
C-16Require authentication on every HTTP MCP endpointAuthenticatehigh
C-17Validate the audience of every access tokenAuthenticatehigh
C-18Never forward the received token downstreamAuthenticatehigh
C-19Use narrow scopes and a credential per serverAuthenticatehigh
C-20Bind stored credentials to their issuerAuthenticatehigh
C-21Require per-client consent on MCP proxy serversAuthenticatemedium
C-22Store tokens in the operating system credential storeAuthenticatemedium
C-23Allow only approved servers through managed settingsConstrainhigh
C-24Keep project servers from approving themselvesConstrainhigh
C-25Run local servers in a sandboxConstrainhigh
C-26Start servers with a minimal environmentConstrainhigh
C-27Bind local HTTP servers to loopback and check Origin and HostConstrainhigh
C-28Restrict outbound network access from serversConstrainhigh
C-29Require confirmation for sensitive tool callsConstrainhigh
C-30Check URLs before a client opens themConstrainhigh
C-31Log every tool call with its parametersObservemedium
C-32Redact secrets and personal data in logsObservemedium
C-33Alert when tool definitions changeObservemedium
C-34Alert on new servers, destinations and cross-server data flowsObservehigh
C-35Send MCP logs to the SIEMObservemedium
C-36Track advisories for approved componentsObservemedium
C-37Write a procedure to remove a server everywhereRespondhigh
C-38Rotate credentials the server could readRespondhigh
C-39Preserve logs and a copy of the packageRespondmedium
C-40Find affected machines from the inventoryRespondhigh
C-41Patch and apply the settings that upgrades do not turn onRespondhigh
C-42Update vetting rules after each incidentRespondmedium

What the checklist covers

The checklist turns the register's risks into actions. It starts with finding every MCP server on machines, then vetting, authentication, constraint, observation and response.

Where a client documents a setting, the step names it: VS Code Copilot enterprise-managed settings use allowedMcpServers and deniedMcpServers, and Claude Code documents managed-mcp.json and enableAllProjectMcpServers.

Sources: AI settings for enterprise, Visual Studio Code docs; Connect Claude Code to tools via MCP, Claude Code docs; Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io.

How the steps are organized

There are 42 steps with identifiers C-01 to C-42. The stages and their step counts are listed below. Each step lists the register rows it addresses in its controls and in a risks field.

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision; OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet.

Using the checklist in a rollout

Teams with no inventory start at C-01 to C-07 and add C-23 once the catalog exists. Teams that already allow-list servers can start at vetting and observation. The tool on the home page tracks progress in the browser only.

Endpoint tools that discover and control MCP servers can support the discover, constrain and observe stages. Vendors document different coverage, and the ranking on this site compares them.

Sources: What's new in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint; Evo ADS MCP Governance Goes GA, Snyk; DefenseClaw 1.0.0 release notes, Cisco.

Item detail

C-01: List every MCP client in use

Write down each application that can load MCP servers: IDEs, desktop AI apps and command-line agents, with versions.

Impact: A server cannot be found if the client that loads it is unknown.

Controls:

  • Survey developers and read software inventory for IDEs, desktop AI apps and agent command-line tools.
  • Record where each client keeps its MCP configuration (user, project and managed levels).
  • Register risks: R-07.

Severity: high

Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ); Connect Claude Code to tools via MCP, Claude Code docs (read ).

C-02: Collect MCP configuration files from machines

Gather the config files that list servers, including project files that arrive with repositories.

Impact: Config files hold the launch commands that decide what code runs.

Controls:

  • Read user-level and project-level files such as .mcp.json and client settings files, and the managed settings you control.
  • Store the collected result with machine, user and date.
  • Register risks: R-07, R-33.

Severity: high

Sources: Connect Claude Code to tools via MCP, Claude Code docs (read ); MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-03: Record how each server is launched

For every server note the command, package name, version, publisher and any environment variables it receives.

Impact: The launch command is what the machine executes; a changed package name or flag is the first sign of a problem.

Controls:

  • Capture the full command without truncation, including npx or other launcher flags.
  • Note which environment variables and credentials the server is given.
  • Register risks: R-01, R-03, R-07.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ).

C-04: Turn on endpoint discovery of configured servers

Use an endpoint tool that reports MCP servers configured on managed machines, so the inventory does not depend on surveys.

Impact: Manual surveys go stale; machine-reported inventory shows servers as they are added.

Controls:

  • Microsoft documents local AI agent discovery, generally available on Windows and macOS in October 2026, that reports each agent's configured MCP servers in Defender for Endpoint.
  • Snyk says Evo ADS MCP Governance discovers MCP servers across the estate, and Cisco's DefenseClaw 1.0.0 notes list a per-item MCP inventory; compare coverage against your clients before choosing.
  • Register risks: R-07.

Severity: high

Sources: What's new in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (read ); Evo ADS MCP Governance Goes GA, Snyk (read ); DefenseClaw 1.0.0 release notes, Cisco (read ).

C-05: Find remote and HTTP MCP endpoints on your network

List MCP servers that listen on a port or are hosted for team use, and who can reach them.

Impact: A server listening on all interfaces, or without authentication, serves its tools to the network.

Controls:

  • Check for MCP servers bound to 0.0.0.0 on developer subnets and for hosted servers in cloud accounts.
  • Record each endpoint's authentication method.
  • Register risks: R-09, R-17.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Streamable HTTP transport, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-06: Assign an owner and review date to each server

Give every server in the inventory a named owner, a purpose and a date by which it is re-reviewed.

Impact: Servers without an owner are never patched or removed.

Controls:

  • Keep owner, purpose, version and next review in the catalog record.
  • Remove servers whose owner cannot be found.
  • Register risks: R-07.

Severity: high

Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ); Evo ADS MCP Governance Goes GA, Snyk (read ).

C-07: Compare the inventory with the approved catalog on a schedule

Diff what is installed against what is approved and report the difference to the owners.

Impact: New and unapproved servers appear continuously; drift left unchecked becomes the norm.

Controls:

  • Run the comparison weekly and report new servers by machine and team.
  • Track servers that changed version since approval.
  • Register risks: R-07, R-05.

Severity: high

Sources: Evo ADS MCP Governance Goes GA, Snyk (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-08: Verify the publisher and the exact package name

Check the name, publisher and repository against the vendor's own documentation before the first install.

Impact: Look-alike and repackaged packages differ from the real one by a character or an address.

Controls:

  • Compare the package name letter by letter with the vendor's documented install command.
  • Check the publisher account, repository link and release history.
  • Register risks: R-01, R-02.

Severity: high

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); Repackaged Amazon SP-API MCP Sends App Secrets to an Undisclosed IP, Knostic (read ).

C-09: Diff the code against the upstream project

For a server that copies an open-source project, compare it with upstream for changed endpoints and authentication code.

Impact: Knostic described a package that copied Amazon's code and replaced the authentication and API addresses.

Controls:

  • Search the code for hardcoded hosts and for changes to token or API endpoints.
  • Reject packages whose README does not account for the differences.
  • Register risks: R-02, R-03.

Severity: high

Sources: Repackaged Amazon SP-API MCP Sends App Secrets to an Undisclosed IP, Knostic (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-10: Review every field of each tool definition

Read the descriptions, parameter names, types, defaults, output schemas and annotations of every tool.

Impact: The model reads all of these, and instructions can sit in any of them.

Controls:

  • Look for text that tells the agent to read credentials, call other tools or hide actions from the user.
  • Run a scanner built for tool definitions as a second check; the OWASP cheat sheet names mcp-scan.
  • Register risks: R-23, R-25, R-26.

Severity: high

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); When an MCP Tool Asks for Your GitHub Token, Knostic (read ); AI tool poisoning through MCP tool descriptions, CrowdStrike (read ).

C-11: Scan the server's dependencies

Run dependency scanning on the server and review known vulnerabilities and maintenance state.

Impact: A vulnerable dependency runs with the server's permissions.

Controls:

  • Scan lockfiles and container images; track advisories for the servers and SDKs you approve.
  • Prefer servers with a documented update path.
  • Register risks: R-04.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); Evo ADS MCP Governance Goes GA, Snyk (read ).

C-12: Check the SDK version against current advisories

Find which MCP SDK the server uses and compare it with the advisories published in October 2026.

Impact: SDK flaws affect every server built on the affected versions.

Controls:

  • Compare with the TypeScript SDK advisories (sdk 1.32.0 and server 2.3.0 are the fixed versions named) and the Python SDK advisories (mcp 1.30.0 and 2.2.0).
  • Check the fix needs a setting: GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 says upgrading alone changes nothing until the audience check is turned on.
  • Register risks: R-08, R-11, R-15, R-21.

Severity: high

Sources: GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience (read ); GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience (read ); GHSA-jm63-cq47-j5jp: MCP TypeScript server SDK cross-client messages (read ); GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453: MCP TypeScript SDK memory exhaustion (read ).

C-13: Test the server in a sandbox with network capture

Run the candidate server in a disposable environment and record its files touched and hosts contacted.

Impact: Behavior on first run shows whether the server does only what it says.

Controls:

  • Use a container or virtual machine with no real credentials and log outbound connections.
  • Use the MCP Inspector to list tools and review definitions; keep it on a current release.
  • Register risks: R-29, R-22, R-35.

Severity: high

Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ); MCP Inspector security documentation (read ).

C-14: Review the launch manifest and environment variables

Read the server's manifest or server.json entry and every environment variable it asks for.

Impact: Variables such as NODE_OPTIONS or a registry setting change how the runtime behaves.

Controls:

  • Reject entries with unexplained environment variables or runtime-control variables.
  • Inspector 2.15.0 flags NODE_OPTIONS and npm_config_registry in its server.json preview; use it as a model for your own review.
  • Register risks: R-30, R-03.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Inspector 2.15.0 release notes (read ); MCP Inspector 2.14.0 release notes (read ).

C-15: Record the decision and pin the approved version

Store the approval with reviewer, date, version and a hash of the tool definitions.

Impact: Without a pin, an approval does not describe tomorrow's server.

Controls:

  • Pin the package version and record the hash of the full tool definition.
  • Do not use registry listings as the approval; key entries by name and version.
  • Register risks: R-05, R-06.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Registry v1.8.8 release notes (read ).

C-16: Require authentication on every HTTP MCP endpoint

Make each remote or HTTP-exposed server refuse requests without valid credentials.

Impact: The protocol makes authorization optional; a server that skips it serves anyone who reaches it.

Controls:

  • Test that a request with no token and one with an arbitrary token are both refused.
  • Place the server on loopback or a private network unless authentication is in place.
  • Register risks: R-09.

Severity: high

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6: mcp-atlassian authentication bypass (CVE-2026-77244) (read ).

C-17: Validate the audience of every access token

Reject tokens that were not issued for this server, using the resource indicator the client sent.

Impact: A token for another service must not work here.

Controls:

  • Check the aud claim against your server's canonical URI (RFC 8707), as the authorization spec requires.
  • Turn on the SDK's audience setting (for example validate_token_resource in the Python SDK) after upgrading.
  • Register risks: R-08.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience (read ); GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience (read ).

C-18: Never forward the received token downstream

Obtain a separate token for each upstream API instead of passing the client's token on.

Impact: Passing tokens through breaks audit trails and lets controls be bypassed.

Controls:

  • Review code paths that call upstream APIs for pass-through of the Authorization header.
  • Log the identity of the caller and the upstream identity separately.
  • Register risks: R-08, R-10.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-19: Use narrow scopes and a credential per server

Request the minimum scopes per tool, and give each server its own credential.

Impact: One shared or broad token turns one flaw into access to everything it covers.

Controls:

  • Prefer short-lived tokens over long-lived personal access tokens.
  • Review the scopes a server requests during vetting and refuse broad ones.
  • Register risks: R-12, R-36.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-20: Bind stored credentials to their issuer

Make clients refuse to send saved credentials to an authorization server other than the one that issued them.

Impact: Credentials sent to a server-named authorization server can be collected by that server.

Controls:

  • Pass expectedIssuer or issuer where your SDK provides it, and clear credentials saved without one.
  • Reject authorization server metadata whose issuer does not match the expected origin.
  • Register risks: R-11, R-14.

Severity: high

Sources: GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h: MCP TypeScript SDK OAuth client credentials (CVE-2026-104850) (read ); GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4: FastMCP client OAuth issuer binding (read ); MCP Python SDK v2.2.0 release notes (read ).

C-21: Require per-client consent on MCP proxy servers

If you run an MCP proxy to a third-party API, store consent per user and per client and match redirect URIs exactly.

Impact: Without per-client consent a proxy can be used to obtain authorization codes without approval.

Controls:

  • Validate the OAuth state parameter and set consent cookies with the __Host- prefix, Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax.
  • Prefer Client ID Metadata Documents; Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated in 2026-07-28.
  • Register risks: R-10, R-14.

Severity: medium

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-22: Store tokens in the operating system credential store

Keep access and refresh tokens in Keychain, Credential Manager or Secret Service, not in config files or plaintext.

Impact: Files with loose permissions give tokens to any local reader.

Controls:

  • Check where each client and server writes tokens; the Inspector's docs say its fallback is a plaintext file when no keychain exists.
  • Set owner-only permissions on any file that must hold a secret.
  • Register risks: R-37.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Inspector security documentation (read ); GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6: mcp-atlassian plaintext OAuth token storage (read ).

C-23: Allow only approved servers through managed settings

Push an allow list of servers to clients so unapproved servers do not load.

Impact: A catalog that clients do not enforce is only advice.

Controls:

  • VS Code Copilot enterprise-managed settings use allowedMcpServers and deniedMcpServers; an empty allowedMcpServers list blocks all servers and deny rules win over the allow list.
  • Claude Code supports managed-mcp.json for a fixed server set and allowedMcpServers and deniedMcpServers for restriction.
  • Register risks: R-01, R-07, R-33.

Severity: high

Sources: AI settings for enterprise, Visual Studio Code docs (read ); Connect Claude Code to tools via MCP, Claude Code docs (read ).

C-24: Keep project servers from approving themselves

Do not enable all project-scoped servers automatically, and require approval for servers that arrive in a repository.

Impact: A cloned repository can carry configuration chosen by its author.

Controls:

  • Leave enableAllProjectMcpServers unset or false in Claude Code and review each project server; Claude Code ignores such approvals committed to the project in an untrusted folder.
  • Use the client's workspace trust prompts.
  • Register risks: R-33, R-30.

Severity: high

Sources: Connect Claude Code to tools via MCP, Claude Code docs (read ); MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-25: Run local servers in a sandbox

Run each local server in a container or sandbox with minimal filesystem and network access.

Impact: A local server otherwise has everything the user account has.

Controls:

  • Mount only the directories the server needs and drop network access unless required.
  • Note that a bare chroot is not a sandbox, per the OWASP cheat sheet.
  • Register risks: R-29, R-32.

Severity: high

Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-26: Start servers with a minimal environment

Pass each server only the variables it needs instead of the whole shell environment.

Impact: Servers inherit the environment of the process that starts them.

Controls:

  • Build the environment explicitly in the launch config.
  • Use separate credentials per server.
  • Register risks: R-36.

Severity: high

Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ).

C-27: Bind local HTTP servers to loopback and check Origin and Host

Listen on 127.0.0.1, validate Origin and answer an invalid one with 403, and allow-list Host values.

Impact: These checks close the DNS rebinding route to local services.

Controls:

  • Follow the Streamable HTTP spec's security requirements for Origin and binding.
  • Prefer stdio or a Unix socket with restricted permissions for local servers.
  • Register risks: R-16, R-17.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Streamable HTTP transport, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); MCP Inspector 2.12.0 release notes (read ).

C-28: Restrict outbound network access from servers

Allow only the destinations a server needs, and route server-side fetches through an egress proxy.

Impact: Blocked egress stops credential and data exfiltration and SSRF reaching internal hosts.

Controls:

  • Block private, loopback and link-local ranges for fetches driven by URLs from servers or models; use a maintained library.
  • Alert on connections to destinations outside the allow list.
  • Register risks: R-22, R-18.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ).

C-29: Require confirmation for sensitive tool calls

Show full parameters and ask for approval for destructive, financial and data-sharing operations, and never auto-approve in multi-server setups.

Impact: Approvals are the control that sits between injected text and an action.

Controls:

  • Use your own policy per tool rather than the server's annotations, which clients must treat as untrusted.
  • Make sure model-generated text cannot satisfy the confirmation.
  • Register risks: R-34, R-26, R-27.

Severity: high

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Tools, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-30: Check URLs before a client opens them

In clients you build, allow only http and https for authorization URLs and open them without a shell.

Impact: Server-supplied URLs reach the operating system's opener.

Controls:

  • Reject javascript:, data:, file: and other schemes using an allow list.
  • Do not use cmd.exe, sh or PowerShell to open a URL.
  • Register risks: R-31, R-18.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); MCP Inspector 2.12.0 release notes (read ).

C-31: Log every tool call with its parameters

Record the tool, parameters, user and time for each invocation.

Impact: Without records an incident cannot be reconstructed.

Controls:

  • Capture the same fields for every client.
  • Keep the logs long enough for your investigation window.
  • Register risks: R-40.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-32: Redact secrets and personal data in logs

Mask credentials and personal data in parameters and results before they are stored.

Impact: Logs otherwise become a second store of secrets.

Controls:

  • Test redaction with sample credentials.
  • Restrict log access and set retention.
  • Register risks: R-41.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-33: Alert when tool definitions change

Compare tool definitions with the pinned hash and alert on any difference, including annotation changes.

Impact: A changed definition is the signal of a rug pull.

Controls:

  • Re-prompt for consent on change.
  • Alert on listChanged notifications from servers not expected to change.
  • Register risks: R-05, R-26.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Tools, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-34: Alert on new servers, destinations and cross-server data flows

Watch for unapproved servers appearing, new outbound hosts and one server's values showing up in another's calls.

Impact: These patterns mark shadowing, exfiltration and unknown installs.

Controls:

  • Add detections for new tools called, unusual call rates and admin-level queries.
  • Feed alerts to the same queue as other security alerts.
  • Register risks: R-24, R-38, R-22, R-07.

Severity: high

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); Evo ADS MCP Governance Goes GA, Snyk (read ).

C-35: Send MCP logs to the SIEM

Forward tool-call logs to the system your responders already use.

Impact: Detection only works if the logs reach the people who can act.

Controls:

  • Use a common schema across clients.
  • Map fields to user and device identity.
  • Register risks: R-40.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-36: Track advisories for approved components

Subscribe to GitHub advisories and release notes for every server and SDK in the catalog.

Impact: Fixes such as the October 2026 SDK advisories only matter if someone reads them.

Controls:

  • Map each advisory to catalog entries and owners.
  • Record the date the fix was deployed.
  • Register risks: R-04, R-13.

Severity: medium

Sources: GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience (read ); MCP Python SDK v2.2.0 release notes (read ).

C-37: Write a procedure to remove a server everywhere

Define how to take a server out of the managed allow list and remove it from configurations.

Impact: Speed matters once a server is found malicious.

Controls:

  • Remove it from the allowed list first, then from config files and caches.
  • Test the procedure on a harmless server.
  • Register risks: R-07.

Severity: high

Sources: AI settings for enterprise, Visual Studio Code docs (read ); Connect Claude Code to tools via MCP, Claude Code docs (read ).

C-38: Rotate credentials the server could read

List the credentials in the server's environment and files and rotate them.

Impact: Knostic's SP-API finding involves credentials sent to a hardcoded address; rotation limits the damage.

Controls:

  • Rotate tokens, keys and refresh tokens that the server held.
  • Revoke sessions at the authorization server.
  • Register risks: R-36, R-02.

Severity: high

Sources: Repackaged Amazon SP-API MCP Sends App Secrets to an Undisclosed IP, Knostic (read ); Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ).

C-39: Preserve logs and a copy of the package

Keep tool-call logs and the exact package version for analysis.

Impact: Registries remove malicious packages, and evidence goes with them.

Controls:

  • Save the package, its hash and the config that launched it.
  • Export logs for the period the server was active.
  • Register risks: R-40.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-40: Find affected machines from the inventory

Use the inventory to list every machine and user running the server or the affected version.

Impact: Scope decides how many credentials to rotate.

Controls:

  • Query by package name and version.
  • Include project-scoped configs.
  • Register risks: R-07.

Severity: high

Sources: Evo ADS MCP Governance Goes GA, Snyk (read ); What's new in Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (read ).

C-41: Patch and apply the settings that upgrades do not turn on

Upgrade affected servers and SDKs, then enable settings the fix needs.

Impact: Some advisories say upgrading alone changes nothing.

Controls:

  • Check the advisory text for required settings such as the audience check or expectedIssuer.
  • Re-test after the change.
  • Register risks: R-08, R-11.

Severity: high

Sources: GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience (read ); GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h: MCP TypeScript SDK OAuth client credentials (CVE-2026-104850) (read ).

C-42: Update vetting rules after each incident

Add what you learned to the vetting checks and catalog rules.

Impact: Each incident shows a gap in review.

Controls:

  • Record the cause and the control that would have caught it.
  • Update the checklist edition and note the date.
  • Register risks: R-06.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

Download and cite

Download the MCP Security Checklist as CSV or JSON. Cite it as: Cite assets as: MCP Server Security, "<asset name>", edition 16 Nov 2026, https://mcpservercybersecurity.com/<asset path>/, licensed CC BY 4.0.