MCP Server Security

MCP security checklist: authenticate

Seven steps make sure callers and tokens are the right ones: require authentication on HTTP endpoints, validate token audience, avoid token passthrough, use narrow scopes, bind credentials to issuers, require proxy consent and store tokens in the operating system credential store. Each cites the MCP spec or an advisory, read on 16 Nov 2026.

Facts read on .

What this stage covers

Make sure callers and tokens are the right ones. There are 7 steps here (C-16 to C-22), each a concrete action an engineer can tick.

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6: mcp-atlassian authentication bypass (CVE-2026-77244); MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision.

Steps in order

Do these in order; each step lists how to do it and the register risks it closes.

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6: mcp-atlassian authentication bypass (CVE-2026-77244); MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision; GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience.

Where the settings come from

Setting names appear only where a primary source documents them. Check each against the client version in use before rollout, because the 2026-07-28 MCP revision and client releases changed several defaults.

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6: mcp-atlassian authentication bypass (CVE-2026-77244); MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision; GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience.

Authenticate: 7 items

C-16: Require authentication on every HTTP MCP endpoint

Make each remote or HTTP-exposed server refuse requests without valid credentials.

Impact: The protocol makes authorization optional; a server that skips it serves anyone who reaches it.

Controls:

  • Test that a request with no token and one with an arbitrary token are both refused.
  • Place the server on loopback or a private network unless authentication is in place.
  • Register risks: R-09.

Severity: high

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6: mcp-atlassian authentication bypass (CVE-2026-77244) (read ).

C-17: Validate the audience of every access token

Reject tokens that were not issued for this server, using the resource indicator the client sent.

Impact: A token for another service must not work here.

Controls:

  • Check the aud claim against your server's canonical URI (RFC 8707), as the authorization spec requires.
  • Turn on the SDK's audience setting (for example validate_token_resource in the Python SDK) after upgrading.
  • Register risks: R-08.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience (read ); GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience (read ).

C-18: Never forward the received token downstream

Obtain a separate token for each upstream API instead of passing the client's token on.

Impact: Passing tokens through breaks audit trails and lets controls be bypassed.

Controls:

  • Review code paths that call upstream APIs for pass-through of the Authorization header.
  • Log the identity of the caller and the upstream identity separately.
  • Register risks: R-08, R-10.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-19: Use narrow scopes and a credential per server

Request the minimum scopes per tool, and give each server its own credential.

Impact: One shared or broad token turns one flaw into access to everything it covers.

Controls:

  • Prefer short-lived tokens over long-lived personal access tokens.
  • Review the scopes a server requests during vetting and refuse broad ones.
  • Register risks: R-12, R-36.

Severity: high

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).

C-20: Bind stored credentials to their issuer

Make clients refuse to send saved credentials to an authorization server other than the one that issued them.

Impact: Credentials sent to a server-named authorization server can be collected by that server.

Controls:

  • Pass expectedIssuer or issuer where your SDK provides it, and clear credentials saved without one.
  • Reject authorization server metadata whose issuer does not match the expected origin.
  • Register risks: R-11, R-14.

Severity: high

Sources: GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h: MCP TypeScript SDK OAuth client credentials (CVE-2026-104850) (read ); GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4: FastMCP client OAuth issuer binding (read ); MCP Python SDK v2.2.0 release notes (read ).

C-21: Require per-client consent on MCP proxy servers

If you run an MCP proxy to a third-party API, store consent per user and per client and match redirect URIs exactly.

Impact: Without per-client consent a proxy can be used to obtain authorization codes without approval.

Controls:

  • Validate the OAuth state parameter and set consent cookies with the __Host- prefix, Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax.
  • Prefer Client ID Metadata Documents; Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated in 2026-07-28.
  • Register risks: R-10, R-14.

Severity: medium

Sources: MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).

C-22: Store tokens in the operating system credential store

Keep access and refresh tokens in Keychain, Credential Manager or Secret Service, not in config files or plaintext.

Impact: Files with loose permissions give tokens to any local reader.

Controls:

  • Check where each client and server writes tokens; the Inspector's docs say its fallback is a plaintext file when no keychain exists.
  • Set owner-only permissions on any file that must hold a secret.
  • Register risks: R-37.

Severity: medium

Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Inspector security documentation (read ); GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6: mcp-atlassian plaintext OAuth token storage (read ).