MCP tool descriptions and schemas risks
Six risks sit in what the model reads: poisoned descriptions, shadowing across servers, hostile schemas and return values, trusted annotations, prompt injection in tool results and server-supplied schemas that burden clients. Each row cites OWASP, the MCP spec or published research, with severity from one written rule, read on 16 Nov 2026.
Facts read on .
What this dimension covers
What the model reads: descriptions, schemas, annotations and tool results. The register holds 6 rows here (R-23, R-24, R-25, R-26, R-27, R-28). Each row states what the risk is, its impact, concrete controls and at least one primary source.
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; When an MCP Tool Asks for Your GitHub Token, Knostic; AI tool poisoning through MCP tool descriptions, CrowdStrike.
Highest-severity rows
Rows that meet the high rule under the written rule are: R-23 Poisoned tool description; R-27 Prompt injection through tool results.
- R-23: The agent takes an action the user did not request, such as reading a credential.
- R-27: An approved server can still cause unapproved actions through the content it returns.
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; When an MCP Tool Asks for Your GitHub Token, Knostic; AI tool poisoning through MCP tool descriptions, CrowdStrike; MCP Tools, 2026-07-28 revision.
First controls to apply
Start with the controls on the high rows, then work down. Controls name settings only where a primary source documents them; check each against the version your clients run.
- R-23: Review the full text of every tool description and parameter field before a server is approved.
- R-24: Treat each server as its own security domain and keep sensitive servers apart from general-purpose ones.
- R-25: Inspect every field of the definition, including inputSchema and outputSchema.
- R-26: Treat annotations as hints only and decide approval from your own policy per tool.
- R-27: Treat every tool response as untrusted data, including responses from approved servers.
- R-28: Evaluate server-supplied patterns with a linear-time matcher and limits.
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; When an MCP Tool Asks for Your GitHub Token, Knostic; AI tool poisoning through MCP tool descriptions, CrowdStrike; MCP Tools, 2026-07-28 revision.
Tool descriptions and schemas: 6 items
R-23: Poisoned tool description
Instructions hidden in a tool description steer the model, which reads the description to decide how to call the tool. Knostic described a package on 12 Nov 2026 whose description tells the agent to fetch a GitHub token without asking the user.
Impact: The agent takes an action the user did not request, such as reading a credential.
Controls:
- Review the full text of every tool description and parameter field before a server is approved.
- Hash and pin the reviewed definitions and alert on change.
- Scan descriptions with a tool built for the purpose (the OWASP cheat sheet names mcp-scan) and keep a human approval step for sensitive calls.
Severity: high
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); When an MCP Tool Asks for Your GitHub Token, Knostic (read ); AI tool poisoning through MCP tool descriptions, CrowdStrike (read ).
R-24: Tool shadowing across servers
One server's tool text manipulates how the agent uses tools from another, trusted server, because the model sees all connected descriptions at once.
Impact: A low-trust server can alter how a high-trust one is used, including which data is sent where.
Controls:
- Treat each server as its own security domain and keep sensitive servers apart from general-purpose ones.
- Monitor for cross-server data flows, such as one server's credentials appearing in another's calls.
- Limit how many servers a single agent session may load.
Severity: medium
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).
R-25: Hostile content in schemas and return values
Instructions can sit in parameter names, types, defaults and the values a tool returns, not only in the description field.
Impact: Review that checks only the description misses the other fields the model reads.
Controls:
- Inspect every field of the definition, including inputSchema and outputSchema.
- Set additionalProperties to false and use pattern constraints on string fields.
- Validate and sanitize tool outputs before they re-enter model context.
Severity: medium
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Tools, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).
R-26: Annotations trusted as enforcement
A client lets a server's readOnlyHint or destructiveHint decide how much approval to ask for. The spec says clients must consider annotations untrusted unless they come from trusted servers.
Impact: A flipped hint can change approval behavior with no visible change to the description.
Controls:
- Treat annotations as hints only and decide approval from your own policy per tool.
- Include annotations in the pinned hash of each tool definition.
- Require confirmation for sensitive reads, writes and irreversible actions whatever the label says.
Severity: medium
Sources: MCP Tools, 2026-07-28 revision (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).
R-27: Prompt injection through tool results
A tool returns text, such as a web page or ticket, that contains instructions the model then follows.
Impact: An approved server can still cause unapproved actions through the content it returns.
Controls:
- Treat every tool response as untrusted data, including responses from approved servers.
- Enforce authorization and validate follow-up tool calls in application code, regardless of the model's interpretation.
- Extract structured fields from retrieval tools instead of passing raw pages.
Severity: high
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).
R-28: Server-supplied schemas that exhaust or confuse clients
A client evaluates patterns or fetches references in a schema a server supplies. Inspector 2.14.0 now checks schema patterns in bounded time, and Python SDK advisory GHSA-rwrf-2pqf-9j8j describes a client fetching server-chosen $ref URLs.
Impact: A hostile server can slow or break a client, or cause it to make requests it should not.
Controls:
- Evaluate server-supplied patterns with a linear-time matcher and limits.
- Do not resolve remote references from schemas supplied by untrusted servers.
- Keep MCP clients and the Inspector on current releases.
Severity: low
Sources: MCP Inspector 2.14.0 release notes (read ); GHSA-rwrf-2pqf-9j8j: MCP Python SDK server-chosen $ref URLs (read ).