MCP data exposure and logging risks
Seven risks cover where secrets and data end up: inherited environment variables, plaintext token files, exfiltration through legitimate calls, secrets requested by elicitation, missing tool-call records, secrets inside logs and protected data returned through resource templates. Each row has controls and a primary source, read on 16 Nov 2026.
Facts read on .
What this dimension covers
Where secrets and data end up: environment, token storage, exfiltration channels and logs. The register holds 7 rows here (R-36, R-37, R-38, R-39, R-40, R-41, R-42). Each row states what the risk is, its impact, concrete controls and at least one primary source.
Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io; OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6: mcp-atlassian plaintext OAuth token storage.
Highest-severity rows
Rows that meet the high rule under the written rule are: R-36 Secrets inherited through the environment; R-38 Data exfiltration through legitimate tool calls.
- R-36: A server that needs one key can read all of them.
- R-38: Data leaves through channels that policy allows.
Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io; OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6: mcp-atlassian plaintext OAuth token storage; MCP Inspector security documentation.
First controls to apply
Start with the controls on the high rows, then work down. Controls name settings only where a primary source documents them; check each against the version your clients run.
- R-36: Start servers with a minimal environment and pass only the variables each one needs.
- R-37: Use the OS credential store (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service).
- R-38: Monitor for credentials or sensitive values from one server appearing in calls to another.
- R-39: Reject servers that request secrets in form mode and use URL mode for credential steps.
- R-40: Log every tool invocation with full parameters, user context and timestamp.
- R-41: Redact secrets and personal data before storing tool-call logs.
- R-42: Check authorization for the final resource that is returned, not the template.
Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io; OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet; GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6: mcp-atlassian plaintext OAuth token storage; MCP Inspector security documentation.
Data exposure and logging: 7 items
R-36: Secrets inherited through the environment
A server started by the client inherits the environment of the host process, which often holds cloud keys and tokens.
Impact: A server that needs one key can read all of them.
Controls:
- Start servers with a minimal environment and pass only the variables each one needs.
- Use separate credentials per server with the least privilege.
- Keep secrets in an OS credential store rather than in the shell profile.
Severity: high
Sources: Local Server Security, modelcontextprotocol.io (read ); OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).
R-37: Tokens stored in plaintext
A server or client saves OAuth tokens in a file with loose permissions or in plain text. mcp-atlassian advisories GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6 and GHSA-4596-2p6p-28cv describe this, and the Inspector's docs say its secrets fall back to a plaintext file when no OS keychain exists.
Impact: Any local process or user that can read the file gets the tokens.
Controls:
- Use the OS credential store (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service).
- Set file permissions to the owner only where files are unavoidable.
- Never store tokens in MCP config files, which the OWASP cheat sheet also says.
Severity: medium
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6: mcp-atlassian plaintext OAuth token storage (read ); MCP Inspector security documentation (read ).
R-38: Data exfiltration through legitimate tool calls
Injected instructions encode sensitive data into ordinary-looking calls, such as search queries or email subjects.
Impact: Data leaves through channels that policy allows.
Controls:
- Monitor for credentials or sensitive values from one server appearing in calls to another.
- Restrict which tools can send data outside the organization and require approval for them.
- Limit the data each server can read in the first place.
Severity: high
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).
R-39: Sensitive data requested through form elicitation
A server uses form-mode elicitation to ask the user for a password, API key or token, which passes through the client.
Impact: Secrets pass through the client and its logs. The spec forbids it.
Controls:
- Reject servers that request secrets in form mode and use URL mode for credential steps.
- Show which server is asking and let the user decline.
- Review elicitation requests during server vetting.
Severity: medium
Sources: MCP Elicitation, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).
R-40: No record of tool calls
Tool invocations are not logged with their parameters, user and time, so there is nothing to investigate after an incident.
Impact: A misuse or a poisoned call cannot be reconstructed, and anomalies go unseen.
Controls:
- Log every tool invocation with full parameters, user context and timestamp.
- Send the logs to a SIEM and alert on new tools, admin-level queries and unusual call rates.
- Keep the logs long enough to cover an investigation window you set.
Severity: medium
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ); MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).
R-41: Secrets and personal data written into logs
Logging full parameters also records secrets and personal data that appear in arguments and results.
Impact: The log store becomes a second place to steal credentials from.
Controls:
- Redact secrets and personal data before storing tool-call logs.
- Restrict who can read the logs and set a retention period.
- Test the redaction rules with sample credentials.
Severity: medium
Sources: OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet (read ).
R-42: Protected data returned through resources and templates
Resources and resource templates expose data by URI, and a template can retrieve a resource that a rule denied.
Impact: Data outside a caller's rights is returned. FastMCP's GHSA-7xgj fix makes a denied concrete resource shadow a matching template.
Controls:
- Check authorization for the final resource that is returned, not the template.
- Avoid overlapping proxy templates for protected resources.
- Test reads for denied URIs through every route.
Severity: medium
Sources: GHSA-7xgj-8392-5q4r: FastMCP post-transform authorization (read ); MCP Tools, 2026-07-28 revision (read ).