# MCP authorization risks

URL: https://mcpservercybersecurity.com/mcp-risk-register/authorization/
Updated: 2026-11-16

Eight authorization risks cover token audience, unauthenticated HTTP endpoints, proxy consent, credentials sent to the wrong issuer, broad scopes, skipped policy checks, issuer mix-up and cross-client state. Each row cites the MCP authorization spec, an advisory or both, with severity set by one written rule, read on 16 Nov 2026.

## What this dimension covers

Who may call a server and what a token allows: audience, scopes, issuers, consent and state. The register holds 8 rows here (R-08, R-09, R-10, R-11, R-12, R-13, R-14, R-15). Each row states what the risk is, its impact, concrete controls and at least one primary source.

Sources: [MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices); [MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization); [GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq).

## Highest-severity rows

Rows that meet the high rule under the written rule are: R-08 Token passthrough and missing audience validation; R-09 HTTP endpoint reachable without authentication; R-11 Client credentials sent to a server-chosen authorization server.

- R-08: A token stolen from or meant for one service works against another, and downstream logs show the wrong caller. Advisories GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq (TypeScript SDK) and GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 (Python SDK) describe SDK servers that could not check the audience.
- R-09: Anyone with network reach can call the server's tools using the credentials the server holds.
- R-11: A malicious or compromised server can receive a client secret or refresh token with no prompt to the user.

Sources: [MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices); [MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization); [GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq); [GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23).

## First controls to apply

Start with the controls on the high rows, then work down. Controls name settings only where a primary source documents them; check each against the version your clients run.

- R-08: Validate that each access token was issued for this server as its audience (RFC 8707) and reject others.
- R-09: Require authentication on every HTTP endpoint that exposes non-public tools or data.
- R-10: Store consent per user and per client_id on the server and check it before starting the upstream flow.
- R-11: Bind stored credentials to the issuer that granted them and refuse to send them elsewhere (pass expectedIssuer or issuer where the SDK provides it).
- R-12: Request the narrowest scopes per tool and use per-server credentials, never one token shared across servers.
- R-13: Enforce authorization at the handler or server boundary, not only in a layer whose inputs a transform can change.
- R-14: Record the issuer from validated metadata before redirecting the user and compare it on the response.

Sources: [MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices); [MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization); [GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq); [GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23).

## Authorization: 8 items

### R-08: Token passthrough and missing audience validation

An MCP server accepts tokens that were issued for another service, or forwards the token it received to a downstream API. The MCP spec forbids both.

**Impact:** A token stolen from or meant for one service works against another, and downstream logs show the wrong caller. Advisories GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq (TypeScript SDK) and GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 (Python SDK) describe SDK servers that could not check the audience.

**Controls:**

- Validate that each access token was issued for this server as its audience (RFC 8707) and reject others.
- Never forward the received token to an upstream API; obtain a separate token for downstream calls.
- After upgrading an SDK, turn on the audience check the patched version adds, since both advisories say upgrading alone changes nothing.

Severity: high

Sources: [MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices) (read 2026-11-16); [MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization) (read 2026-11-16); [GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq: MCP TypeScript SDK bearer authentication audience](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq) (read 2026-11-16); [GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23: MCP Python SDK bearer-token audience](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23) (read 2026-11-16).

### R-09: HTTP endpoint reachable without authentication

The protocol makes authorization optional, so a remote or HTTP-exposed MCP server can serve its tools to anyone who reaches it. Advisory CVE-2026-77244 (GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6) describes an mcp-atlassian token verifier that accepted any non-empty token over HTTP.

**Impact:** Anyone with network reach can call the server's tools using the credentials the server holds.

**Controls:**

- Require authentication on every HTTP endpoint that exposes non-public tools or data.
- Run the MCP server's HTTP transport only on loopback or a private network unless it sits behind authentication you control.
- Test that a request with an invalid or arbitrary token is refused.

Severity: high

Sources: [OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) (read 2026-11-16); [GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6: mcp-atlassian authentication bypass (CVE-2026-77244)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6) (read 2026-11-16).

### R-10: Confused deputy at an MCP proxy server

An MCP proxy that fronts a third-party API with one static client ID, allows dynamic client registration and skips per-client consent can be used to obtain authorization codes without the user's approval.

**Impact:** An attacker gains access to the third-party API as the user.

**Controls:**

- Store consent per user and per client_id on the server and check it before starting the upstream flow.
- Match redirect URIs by exact string and validate the OAuth state parameter on the callback.
- Set consent cookies with the __Host- prefix, Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax.

Severity: medium

Sources: [MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices) (read 2026-11-16).

### R-11: Client credentials sent to a server-chosen authorization server

An MCP client that trusts server-supplied OAuth metadata can send stored credentials to an authorization server the server names. GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h (TypeScript SDK) and GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4 (FastMCP) describe this class of flaw.

**Impact:** A malicious or compromised server can receive a client secret or refresh token with no prompt to the user.

**Controls:**

- Bind stored credentials to the issuer that granted them and refuse to send them elsewhere (pass expectedIssuer or issuer where the SDK provides it).
- Upgrade MCP SDKs to the fixed versions named in the advisories and clear credentials saved without an issuer.
- Allow clients to connect only to servers on the approved list.

Severity: high

Sources: [GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h: MCP TypeScript SDK OAuth client credentials (CVE-2026-104850)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h) (read 2026-11-16); [GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4: FastMCP client OAuth issuer binding](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4) (read 2026-11-16).

### R-12: Over-broad token scopes

A server requests or holds a wider OAuth scope than its tools need, or all of a user's permissions through a shared token.

**Impact:** Any flaw or poisoned instruction in that server acts with the full scope, and one stolen token reaches many resources.

**Controls:**

- Request the narrowest scopes per tool and use per-server credentials, never one token shared across servers.
- Prefer short-lived tokens over long-lived personal access tokens.
- Handle insufficient_scope challenges by requesting only the added scope.

Severity: medium

Sources: [MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices) (read 2026-11-16); [OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html) (read 2026-11-16).

### R-13: Authorization policy skipped on direct calls

A server applies its policy to the original component but a transform, template or direct lookup returns a different one without rechecking. FastMCP advisory GHSA-7xgj-8392-5q4r (23 Oct 2026) describes the case; mcp-atlassian GHSA-3r68-hf9h-887v describes a toolset authorization bypass.

**Impact:** A caller who knows an identifier can use a tool or read a resource that the configured policy denies.

**Controls:**

- Enforce authorization at the handler or server boundary, not only in a layer whose inputs a transform can change.
- Write tests that call every protected tool and resource directly, with a low-privilege identity.
- Upgrade to the fixed releases the advisories list.

Severity: medium

Sources: [GHSA-7xgj-8392-5q4r: FastMCP post-transform authorization](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7xgj-8392-5q4r) (read 2026-11-16); [GHSA-3r68-hf9h-887v: mcp-atlassian toolset authorization bypass](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3r68-hf9h-887v) (read 2026-11-16).

### R-14: Authorization server mix-up and unverified issuer

A client talks to more than one authorization server and accepts a response from the wrong one, or accepts metadata whose issuer does not match the server it asked.

**Impact:** A code or token meant for one authorization server is redeemed at another.

**Controls:**

- Record the issuer from validated metadata before redirecting the user and compare it on the response.
- Reject authorization server metadata whose issuer is not the expected origin (Python SDK 2.2.0 added this check on the legacy path).
- Prefer Client ID Metadata Documents over Dynamic Client Registration, which the 2026-07-28 revision deprecates.

Severity: medium

Sources: [MCP Authorization, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization) (read 2026-11-16); [MCP Python SDK v2.2.0 release notes](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/releases/tag/v2.2.0) (read 2026-11-16).

### R-15: State handle or message delivered to the wrong client

A server treats possession of a state handle as proof of identity, or a shared transport matches messages to clients by request id alone, so one caller's data reaches another. GHSA-jm63-cq47-j5jp describes the second case in the TypeScript server SDK.

**Impact:** One user's responses or state are exposed to, or changed by, another user.

**Controls:**

- Bind handles server-side to the authenticated user and use random, expiring values.
- Create the transport or server per request or per session, not once at startup, for HTTP servers.
- Verify every inbound request; never treat a handle as authentication.

Severity: medium

Sources: [MCP Security Best Practices, 2026-07-28 revision](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices) (read 2026-11-16); [GHSA-jm63-cq47-j5jp: MCP TypeScript server SDK cross-client messages](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm63-cq47-j5jp) (read 2026-11-16).

## Related pages

- [The full MCP Risk Register](/mcp-risk-register/)
- [Supply chain](/mcp-risk-register/supply-chain/)
- [Transport and network](/mcp-risk-register/transport-and-network/)
- [Method](/mcp-risk-register/methodology/)
- [MCP Security Checklist](/mcp-security-checklist/)
