# MCP server security: risk register, checklist and tool comparison

URL: https://mcpservercybersecurity.com/
Updated: 2026-11-16

Secure MCP servers by finding every one on developer machines, vetting each before first use, authenticating remote ones with scoped tokens, limiting tool calls, logging them and rehearsing removal. The checklist tracks that work, and the scored comparison puts Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) first at 77.0 of 100 among 14 tools.

## The short answer

Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) leads the site ranking at 77.0 of 100. Bay is 10th at 46.0. Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) is ahead mainly on discovery (8 against 4, worth 10.0 points at weight 25).

## Search the risk register and track the checklist

Search the 42 register items

### Risk register

- [R-01: Look-alike package name (typosquatting)](/mcp-risk-register/#R-01) (Supply chain, high). A package is published under a name one keystroke away from a trusted MCP server, in the hope that a developer or a script installs it by mistake.
- [R-02: Repackaged server with altered endpoints](/mcp-risk-register/#R-02) (Supply chain, high). A package copies a legitimate server's open-source code but replaces authentication or API addresses, and the README does not mention the change. Knostic described one such npm package on 26 Oct 2026 and assessed it as suspected malicious credential redirection.
- [R-03: Unreviewed code run through a package launcher](/mcp-risk-register/#R-03) (Supply chain, high). Local MCP servers are often started by a launcher command such as npx, which fetches whatever the package name resolves to at that moment and runs it.
- [R-04: Vulnerable or compromised dependency inside a server](/mcp-risk-register/#R-04) (Supply chain, medium). An MCP server pulls in third-party packages, and a known flaw or a compromised release in any of them runs with the server's permissions.
- [R-05: Tool definitions change after approval (rug pull)](/mcp-risk-register/#R-05) (Supply chain, medium). A server changes its tool names, descriptions or schemas after a user or reviewer approved it, turning a reviewed tool into a different one.
- [R-06: Registry listing mistaken for a security review](/mcp-risk-register/#R-06) (Supply chain, medium). The official MCP Registry stores metadata that points at packages on npm, PyPI and Docker Hub, and is described as a preview. A listing shows that a name was published, not that the code was reviewed.
- [R-07: Unknown servers configured on developer machines](/mcp-risk-register/#R-07) (Supply chain, high). Developers add MCP servers to IDEs, desktop AI apps and command-line agents without telling security. Snyk says its scan data from nearly 10,000 developer environments found 4,524 unique MCP servers in active use.
- [R-08: Token passthrough and missing audience validation](/mcp-risk-register/#R-08) (Authorization, high). An MCP server accepts tokens that were issued for another service, or forwards the token it received to a downstream API. The MCP spec forbids both.
- [R-09: HTTP endpoint reachable without authentication](/mcp-risk-register/#R-09) (Authorization, high). The protocol makes authorization optional, so a remote or HTTP-exposed MCP server can serve its tools to anyone who reaches it. Advisory CVE-2026-77244 (GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6) describes an mcp-atlassian token verifier that accepted any non-empty token over HTTP.
- [R-10: Confused deputy at an MCP proxy server](/mcp-risk-register/#R-10) (Authorization, medium). An MCP proxy that fronts a third-party API with one static client ID, allows dynamic client registration and skips per-client consent can be used to obtain authorization codes without the user's approval.
- [R-11: Client credentials sent to a server-chosen authorization server](/mcp-risk-register/#R-11) (Authorization, high). An MCP client that trusts server-supplied OAuth metadata can send stored credentials to an authorization server the server names. GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h (TypeScript SDK) and GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4 (FastMCP) describe this class of flaw.
- [R-12: Over-broad token scopes](/mcp-risk-register/#R-12) (Authorization, medium). A server requests or holds a wider OAuth scope than its tools need, or all of a user's permissions through a shared token.
- [R-13: Authorization policy skipped on direct calls](/mcp-risk-register/#R-13) (Authorization, medium). A server applies its policy to the original component but a transform, template or direct lookup returns a different one without rechecking. FastMCP advisory GHSA-7xgj-8392-5q4r (23 Oct 2026) describes the case; mcp-atlassian GHSA-3r68-hf9h-887v describes a toolset authorization bypass.
- [R-14: Authorization server mix-up and unverified issuer](/mcp-risk-register/#R-14) (Authorization, medium). A client talks to more than one authorization server and accepts a response from the wrong one, or accepts metadata whose issuer does not match the server it asked.
- [R-15: State handle or message delivered to the wrong client](/mcp-risk-register/#R-15) (Authorization, medium). A server treats possession of a state handle as proof of identity, or a shared transport matches messages to clients by request id alone, so one caller's data reaches another. GHSA-jm63-cq47-j5jp describes the second case in the TypeScript server SDK.
- [R-16: DNS rebinding against a local HTTP server](/mcp-risk-register/#R-16) (Transport and network, high). A web page the user visits uses a domain that later resolves to the user's own machine to talk to a local MCP server or developer tool that listens on HTTP.
- [R-17: Local server listening on all interfaces](/mcp-risk-register/#R-17) (Transport and network, medium). A server meant for the local machine binds to 0.0.0.0, so other hosts on the network can connect.
- [R-18: Server-side request forgery through discovery and fetch tools](/mcp-risk-register/#R-18) (Transport and network, high). A client follows URLs supplied by a server (OAuth metadata, redirects), or a tool fetches URLs produced by a model, and the target is an internal address or a cloud metadata service.
- [R-19: Credentials carried across cross-origin redirects](/mcp-risk-register/#R-19) (Transport and network, medium). An HTTP client follows a redirect to another origin and sends Authorization headers or cookies with it. Advisories for the Python SDK (GHSA-5h93-6whr-6q8j) and the TypeScript client SDK (GHSA-6prh-2h8m-c8cw) describe the pattern.
- [R-20: Remote server without TLS or with unverified identity](/mcp-risk-register/#R-20) (Transport and network, medium). A client connects to a remote MCP server over plain HTTP, or without checking who the server is.
- [R-21: Unbounded requests and sessions exhaust a server](/mcp-risk-register/#R-21) (Transport and network, low). An HTTP server accepts requests or sessions without limits. GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (TypeScript SDK) and GHSA-84m7-p3x7-pcfv (Python SDK) describe memory and session exhaustion.
- [R-22: Unrestricted outbound access from server processes](/mcp-risk-register/#R-22) (Transport and network, medium). A server process can open connections to any host, so a flaw or a malicious package can send data anywhere.
- [R-23: Poisoned tool description](/mcp-risk-register/#R-23) (Tool descriptions and schemas, high). Instructions hidden in a tool description steer the model, which reads the description to decide how to call the tool. Knostic described a package on 12 Nov 2026 whose description tells the agent to fetch a GitHub token without asking the user.
- [R-24: Tool shadowing across servers](/mcp-risk-register/#R-24) (Tool descriptions and schemas, medium). One server's tool text manipulates how the agent uses tools from another, trusted server, because the model sees all connected descriptions at once.
- [R-25: Hostile content in schemas and return values](/mcp-risk-register/#R-25) (Tool descriptions and schemas, medium). Instructions can sit in parameter names, types, defaults and the values a tool returns, not only in the description field.
- [R-26: Annotations trusted as enforcement](/mcp-risk-register/#R-26) (Tool descriptions and schemas, medium). A client lets a server's readOnlyHint or destructiveHint decide how much approval to ask for. The spec says clients must consider annotations untrusted unless they come from trusted servers.
- [R-27: Prompt injection through tool results](/mcp-risk-register/#R-27) (Tool descriptions and schemas, high). A tool returns text, such as a web page or ticket, that contains instructions the model then follows.
- [R-28: Server-supplied schemas that exhaust or confuse clients](/mcp-risk-register/#R-28) (Tool descriptions and schemas, low). A client evaluates patterns or fetches references in a schema a server supplies. Inspector 2.14.0 now checks schema patterns in bounded time, and Python SDK advisory GHSA-rwrf-2pqf-9j8j describes a client fetching server-chosen $ref URLs.
- [R-29: Local server runs with the user's full privileges](/mcp-risk-register/#R-29) (Execution and filesystem, high). A local MCP server is an ordinary process launched by the host application. It inherits the user's environment variables and can read anything the account can read.
- [R-30: Malicious startup command in configuration](/mcp-risk-register/#R-30) (Execution and filesystem, high). A client configuration or one-click install carries a launch command that runs code. The spec lists a malicious startup command as a local-server compromise route.
- [R-31: Command injection through arguments or URL opening](/mcp-risk-register/#R-31) (Execution and filesystem, high). Text from a model, a tool argument or a server-supplied OAuth authorization URL reaches a shell. The Inspector's 2.12.0 notes say a remote server's authorization URL could previously run commands through the opener on Windows and WSL.
- [R-32: Path traversal and arbitrary file read in file tools](/mcp-risk-register/#R-32) (Execution and filesystem, high). A tool that reads or uploads files accepts a path without limiting it to an intended directory. 14 of the 25 mcp-atlassian advisories published on 22 Sep 2026 concern file read through attachment tools.
- [R-33: Project configuration from a cloned repository](/mcp-risk-register/#R-33) (Execution and filesystem, high). A repository carries MCP configuration that a client could load automatically. Claude Code's docs say a cloned repository cannot approve its own servers and that approval settings committed to the project are ignored in an untrusted folder.
- [R-34: Tool calls auto-approved without full arguments](/mcp-risk-register/#R-34) (Execution and filesystem, high). A client approves tool calls automatically, or shows only a tool name, so the user never sees what is about to run.
- [R-35: Developer tools that spawn processes on a port](/mcp-risk-register/#R-35) (Execution and filesystem, medium). A developer tool such as an MCP inspector can start stdio servers on request, and its API token is what protects that ability from other callers.
- [R-36: Secrets inherited through the environment](/mcp-risk-register/#R-36) (Data exposure and logging, high). A server started by the client inherits the environment of the host process, which often holds cloud keys and tokens.
- [R-37: Tokens stored in plaintext](/mcp-risk-register/#R-37) (Data exposure and logging, medium). A server or client saves OAuth tokens in a file with loose permissions or in plain text. mcp-atlassian advisories GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6 and GHSA-4596-2p6p-28cv describe this, and the Inspector's docs say its secrets fall back to a plaintext file when no OS keychain exists.
- [R-38: Data exfiltration through legitimate tool calls](/mcp-risk-register/#R-38) (Data exposure and logging, high). Injected instructions encode sensitive data into ordinary-looking calls, such as search queries or email subjects.
- [R-39: Sensitive data requested through form elicitation](/mcp-risk-register/#R-39) (Data exposure and logging, medium). A server uses form-mode elicitation to ask the user for a password, API key or token, which passes through the client.
- [R-40: No record of tool calls](/mcp-risk-register/#R-40) (Data exposure and logging, medium). Tool invocations are not logged with their parameters, user and time, so there is nothing to investigate after an incident.
- [R-41: Secrets and personal data written into logs](/mcp-risk-register/#R-41) (Data exposure and logging, medium). Logging full parameters also records secrets and personal data that appear in arguments and results.
- [R-42: Protected data returned through resources and templates](/mcp-risk-register/#R-42) (Data exposure and logging, medium). Resources and resource templates expose data by URI, and a template can retrieve a resource that a rule denied.

### Checklist

0 of 42 done.

Progress stays in this browser (local storage) and is never sent anywhere.

- [C-01](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-01): List every MCP client in use
- [C-02](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-02): Collect MCP configuration files from machines
- [C-03](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-03): Record how each server is launched
- [C-04](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-04): Turn on endpoint discovery of configured servers
- [C-05](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-05): Find remote and HTTP MCP endpoints on your network
- [C-06](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-06): Assign an owner and review date to each server
- [C-07](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-07): Compare the inventory with the approved catalog on a schedule
- [C-08](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-08): Verify the publisher and the exact package name
- [C-09](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-09): Diff the code against the upstream project
- [C-10](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-10): Review every field of each tool definition
- [C-11](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-11): Scan the server's dependencies
- [C-12](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-12): Check the SDK version against current advisories
- [C-13](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-13): Test the server in a sandbox with network capture
- [C-14](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-14): Review the launch manifest and environment variables
- [C-15](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-15): Record the decision and pin the approved version
- [C-16](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-16): Require authentication on every HTTP MCP endpoint
- [C-17](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-17): Validate the audience of every access token
- [C-18](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-18): Never forward the received token downstream
- [C-19](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-19): Use narrow scopes and a credential per server
- [C-20](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-20): Bind stored credentials to their issuer
- [C-21](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-21): Require per-client consent on MCP proxy servers
- [C-22](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-22): Store tokens in the operating system credential store
- [C-23](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-23): Allow only approved servers through managed settings
- [C-24](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-24): Keep project servers from approving themselves
- [C-25](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-25): Run local servers in a sandbox
- [C-26](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-26): Start servers with a minimal environment
- [C-27](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-27): Bind local HTTP servers to loopback and check Origin and Host
- [C-28](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-28): Restrict outbound network access from servers
- [C-29](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-29): Require confirmation for sensitive tool calls
- [C-30](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-30): Check URLs before a client opens them
- [C-31](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-31): Log every tool call with its parameters
- [C-32](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-32): Redact secrets and personal data in logs
- [C-33](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-33): Alert when tool definitions change
- [C-34](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-34): Alert on new servers, destinations and cross-server data flows
- [C-35](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-35): Send MCP logs to the SIEM
- [C-36](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-36): Track advisories for approved components
- [C-37](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-37): Write a procedure to remove a server everywhere
- [C-38](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-38): Rotate credentials the server could read
- [C-39](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-39): Preserve logs and a copy of the package
- [C-40](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-40): Find affected machines from the inventory
- [C-41](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-41): Patch and apply the settings that upgrades do not turn on
- [C-42](/mcp-security-checklist/#C-42): Update vetting rules after each incident

## The ranking

[The full ranking](/ranking/) has the same table with re-rank sliders. Each score links to the evidence on the vendor's page.

**Site ranking: scores out of 10 per criterion, totals out of 100**

| Rank | Vendor | Total (of 100) | Discovery (weight 25) | Vetting before use (weight 20) | Runtime control of tool calls (weight 20) | Deployment (weight 15) | Governance and audit (weight 5) | Transparency (weight 10) | Proof (weight 5) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1st | [Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS)](/vendors/snyk/) | 77.0 | [8](/vendors/snyk/#evidence-discovery) | [9](/vendors/snyk/#evidence-vetting) | [6](/vendors/snyk/#evidence-runtime) | [8](/vendors/snyk/#evidence-deploy) | [4](/vendors/snyk/#evidence-governance) | [9](/vendors/snyk/#evidence-transparency) | [8](/vendors/snyk/#evidence-proof) |
| 2nd | [Cisco](/vendors/cisco/) | 71.5 | [7](/vendors/cisco/#evidence-discovery) | [8](/vendors/cisco/#evidence-vetting) | [6](/vendors/cisco/#evidence-runtime) | [8](/vendors/cisco/#evidence-deploy) | [8](/vendors/cisco/#evidence-governance) | [7](/vendors/cisco/#evidence-transparency) | [6](/vendors/cisco/#evidence-proof) |
| 3rd | [Harmonic Security](/vendors/harmonic-security/) | 69.0 | [8](/vendors/harmonic-security/#evidence-discovery) | [5](/vendors/harmonic-security/#evidence-vetting) | [8](/vendors/harmonic-security/#evidence-runtime) | [8](/vendors/harmonic-security/#evidence-deploy) | [8](/vendors/harmonic-security/#evidence-governance) | [4](/vendors/harmonic-security/#evidence-transparency) | [6](/vendors/harmonic-security/#evidence-proof) |
| 4th | [Knostic](/vendors/knostic/) | 61.0 | [6](/vendors/knostic/#evidence-discovery) | [7](/vendors/knostic/#evidence-vetting) | [5](/vendors/knostic/#evidence-runtime) | [7](/vendors/knostic/#evidence-deploy) | [6](/vendors/knostic/#evidence-governance) | [6](/vendors/knostic/#evidence-transparency) | [5](/vendors/knostic/#evidence-proof) |
| 5th | [Backslash Security](/vendors/backslash-security/) | 58.5 | [6](/vendors/backslash-security/#evidence-discovery) | [7](/vendors/backslash-security/#evidence-vetting) | [6](/vendors/backslash-security/#evidence-runtime) | [5](/vendors/backslash-security/#evidence-deploy) | [6](/vendors/backslash-security/#evidence-governance) | [4](/vendors/backslash-security/#evidence-transparency) | [6](/vendors/backslash-security/#evidence-proof) |
| 6th | [Pillar Security](/vendors/pillar-security/) | 57.0 | [6](/vendors/pillar-security/#evidence-discovery) | [6](/vendors/pillar-security/#evidence-vetting) | [6](/vendors/pillar-security/#evidence-runtime) | [6](/vendors/pillar-security/#evidence-deploy) | [4](/vendors/pillar-security/#evidence-governance) | [4](/vendors/pillar-security/#evidence-transparency) | [6](/vendors/pillar-security/#evidence-proof) |
| 7th | [Lasso Security](/vendors/lasso-security/) | 56.0 | [6](/vendors/lasso-security/#evidence-discovery) | [6](/vendors/lasso-security/#evidence-vetting) | [6](/vendors/lasso-security/#evidence-runtime) | [4](/vendors/lasso-security/#evidence-deploy) | [7](/vendors/lasso-security/#evidence-governance) | [4](/vendors/lasso-security/#evidence-transparency) | [7](/vendors/lasso-security/#evidence-proof) |
| 8th | [Microsoft](/vendors/microsoft/) | 54.5 | [8](/vendors/microsoft/#evidence-discovery) | [2](/vendors/microsoft/#evidence-vetting) | [4](/vendors/microsoft/#evidence-runtime) | [6](/vendors/microsoft/#evidence-deploy) | [5](/vendors/microsoft/#evidence-governance) | [8](/vendors/microsoft/#evidence-transparency) | [6](/vendors/microsoft/#evidence-proof) |
| 9th | [Noma Security](/vendors/noma-security/) | 51.5 | [6](/vendors/noma-security/#evidence-discovery) | [6](/vendors/noma-security/#evidence-vetting) | [5](/vendors/noma-security/#evidence-runtime) | [4](/vendors/noma-security/#evidence-deploy) | [5](/vendors/noma-security/#evidence-governance) | [3](/vendors/noma-security/#evidence-transparency) | [6](/vendors/noma-security/#evidence-proof) |
| 10th | [Bay](/vendors/bay/) | 46.0 | [4](/vendors/bay/#evidence-discovery) | [4](/vendors/bay/#evidence-vetting) | [6](/vendors/bay/#evidence-runtime) | [6](/vendors/bay/#evidence-deploy) | [7](/vendors/bay/#evidence-governance) | [0](/vendors/bay/#evidence-transparency) | [7](/vendors/bay/#evidence-proof) |
| 11th | [Zenity](/vendors/zenity/) | 44.0 | [5](/vendors/zenity/#evidence-discovery) | [3](/vendors/zenity/#evidence-vetting) | [6](/vendors/zenity/#evidence-runtime) | [3](/vendors/zenity/#evidence-deploy) | [5](/vendors/zenity/#evidence-governance) | [3](/vendors/zenity/#evidence-transparency) | [7](/vendors/zenity/#evidence-proof) |
| 12th | [CrowdStrike](/vendors/crowdstrike/) | 41.0 | [4](/vendors/crowdstrike/#evidence-discovery) | [3](/vendors/crowdstrike/#evidence-vetting) | [3](/vendors/crowdstrike/#evidence-runtime) | [6](/vendors/crowdstrike/#evidence-deploy) | [5](/vendors/crowdstrike/#evidence-governance) | [4](/vendors/crowdstrike/#evidence-transparency) | [7](/vendors/crowdstrike/#evidence-proof) |
| 13th | [Koi](/vendors/koi/) | 39.0 | [4](/vendors/koi/#evidence-discovery) | [5](/vendors/koi/#evidence-vetting) | [2](/vendors/koi/#evidence-runtime) | [6](/vendors/koi/#evidence-deploy) | [2](/vendors/koi/#evidence-governance) | [1](/vendors/koi/#evidence-transparency) | [8](/vendors/koi/#evidence-proof) |
| 14th | [SentinelOne (Prompt Security)](/vendors/sentinelone/) | 36.5 | [4](/vendors/sentinelone/#evidence-discovery) | [3](/vendors/sentinelone/#evidence-vetting) | [3](/vendors/sentinelone/#evidence-runtime) | [4](/vendors/sentinelone/#evidence-deploy) | [3](/vendors/sentinelone/#evidence-governance) | [4](/vendors/sentinelone/#evidence-transparency) | [6](/vendors/sentinelone/#evidence-proof) |

## Who should pick what

With no particular situation, the published ranking applies and Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) comes first. For a specific situation the weights change, and so can the order:

- **[An engineering organization where hundreds of developers add MCP servers to their IDEs](/best-for/many-developers/)**: pick Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) (76.0). Bay is 10th at 49.0. At scale the first problem is knowing which servers exist on which machines, and the tool has to deploy to every laptop.
- **[A security team that needs an MCP inventory across machines this month](/best-for/fast-inventory/)**: pick Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) (78.5). Bay is 10th at 48.0. Speed to an inventory rewards discovery breadth and light deployment; control can follow.
- **[A platform team that wants an approved list of vetted MCP servers](/best-for/approved-catalog/)**: pick Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) (77.5). Bay is 9th at 47.5. An approved list depends on assessing each server before use, so vetting weighs most.
- **[A team whose developers run agents with shell and file access through MCP tools](/best-for/stop-tool-calls/)**: pick Harmonic Security (72.5). Bay is 8th at 52.5. When a tool call can delete or send data, stopping it on the machine as it happens matters most.
- **[A regulated company that must show which MCP servers ran and what they did](/best-for/regulated-audit/)**: pick Cisco (73.0). Bay is 10th at 52.5. Auditors want the record, so the audit log and per-team policy weigh most after discovery.

## What would change this ranking

**Top pair.** Cisco rising from 7 to 10 on discovery (weight 25, so each point moves a total by 2.5) would put Cisco above Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS); the gap is 5.5 points.

**Bay's next place.** Bay rising from 4 to 7 on discovery (weight 25, so each point moves a total by 2.5) would put Bay above Noma Security; the gap is 5.5 points.

A score changes only when a sourced fact changes, and the weights were fixed before the scores. The [method page](/method/) lists the weights, anchors and rules.

## What is MCP server security?

MCP server security is the set of controls that decide which Model Context Protocol servers run, what they can reach and what their tools are allowed to do. It covers local servers that a developer starts from a config file and remote servers reached over HTTP, because both give an AI application the ability to read files, call APIs and run commands.

The protocol leaves much of this to implementers. The MCP specification marks authorization as optional and tells clients to ask for consent before running a local server's startup command, so the work falls to the people who deploy the servers and the clients.

Sources: [MCP specification: Authorization (2025-11-25)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/authorization); [MCP specification: Security Best Practices (2025-11-25)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/security_best_practices).

## Where is the risk register?

The risk register is the searchable table on this page, grouped into six areas: supply chain, authorization, transport and network, tool descriptions and schemas, execution and filesystem, and data exposure and logging. Type a word such as token, npx or log to filter the rows, and each row shows its impact, its controls and its sources.

Every row carries a severity with the rule that sets it, written down on the register's method page. Nothing in a row is a vendor claim unless the row says so.

## How does the checklist track progress?

The checklist covers six steps in order: discover, vet, authenticate, constrain, observe and respond. Tick an item and the page counts your progress; the state is stored only in your browser's local storage, so it stays on your machine and clears when you clear site data.

Each step has its own page with the items, the reason for each and the primary source behind it.

## Which tools discover MCP servers on developer machines?

Fourteen tools are scored on public evidence, and Snyk (Agent Scan, Evo ADS) ranks first at 77.0. The table below shows every total, and five situation pages re-rank the same evidence for large developer populations, fast inventories, approved catalogs, tool-call blocking and regulated audits.

The comparison covers tools that find and control servers on machines and in developer tools. Gateways sit outside it, and the method page explains why.

## How were the sources chosen?

Guides and register rows cite the MCP specification, the OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet, GitHub security advisories and the documentation of the clients and cloud services that host servers. Vendor statements about their own products are written as the vendor's, with the page they came from and the date it was read.

Sources: [MCP specification: Security Best Practices (2025-11-25)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-11-25/basic/security_best_practices); [OWASP MCP Security Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html).

## Latest news, guides and data

- [Knostic: MCP tool asks agents for a GitHub token](/news/knostic-mcp-tool-description-asks-agent-for-github-token/) (2026-11-12)
- [MCP draft spec adopts Client ID Metadata draft 03](/news/mcp-spec-draft-client-id-metadata-document-draft-03/) (2026-11-09)
- [MCP Registry v1.8.8: key listings by name and version](/news/mcp-registry-v1-8-8-listings-keyed-by-name-and-version/) (2026-11-06)
- [Building an Approved MCP Server Catalog for Your Company](/guides/building-an-approved-mcp-server-catalog/)
- [How to Review an MCP Server for Security: Code and Tools](/guides/how-to-review-an-mcp-server-security/)
- [How to Vet an MCP Server Before Use: Steps and Signals](/guides/how-to-vet-an-mcp-server-before-use/)
- [MCP Risk Register](/mcp-risk-register/), with [CSV and JSON downloads](/datasets/mcp-risk-register/)
- [MCP Security Checklist](/mcp-security-checklist/), with [CSV and JSON downloads](/datasets/mcp-security-checklist/)

## Related pages

- [Full ranking with re-rank sliders](/ranking/)
- [How the scores and weights work](/method/)
- [Vendor profiles with evidence](/vendors/)
- [Best tool by situation](/best-for/)
- [MCP Risk Register](/mcp-risk-register/)
- [MCP Security Checklist](/mcp-security-checklist/)
- [Guides](/guides/)
- [Frequently asked questions](/faq/)
