{
 "name": "MCP Security Checklist",
 "edition": "2026-11-16",
 "read_date": "2026-11-16",
 "license": "CC BY 4.0",
 "cite": "Cite assets as: MCP Server Security, \"<asset name>\", edition 16 Nov 2026, https://mcpservercybersecurity.com/<asset path>/, licensed CC BY 4.0.",
 "source": "https://mcpservercybersecurity.com/datasets/mcp-security-checklist/",
 "rows": [
  {
   "id": "C-01",
   "category": "Discover",
   "name": "List every MCP client in use",
   "what": "Write down each application that can load MCP servers: IDEs, desktop AI apps and command-line agents, with versions.",
   "impact": "A server cannot be found if the client that loads it is unknown.",
   "controls": "Survey developers and read software inventory for IDEs, desktop AI apps and agent command-line tools. | Record where each client keeps its MCP configuration (user, project and managed levels). | Register risks: R-07.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-02",
   "category": "Discover",
   "name": "Collect MCP configuration files from machines",
   "what": "Gather the config files that list servers, including project files that arrive with repositories.",
   "impact": "Config files hold the launch commands that decide what code runs.",
   "controls": "Read user-level and project-level files such as .mcp.json and client settings files, and the managed settings you control. | Store the collected result with machine, user and date. | Register risks: R-07, R-33.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-03",
   "category": "Discover",
   "name": "Record how each server is launched",
   "what": "For every server note the command, package name, version, publisher and any environment variables it receives.",
   "impact": "The launch command is what the machine executes; a changed package name or flag is the first sign of a problem.",
   "controls": "Capture the full command without truncation, including npx or other launcher flags. | Note which environment variables and credentials the server is given. | Register risks: R-01, R-03, R-07.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-04",
   "category": "Discover",
   "name": "Turn on endpoint discovery of configured servers",
   "what": "Use an endpoint tool that reports MCP servers configured on managed machines, so the inventory does not depend on surveys.",
   "impact": "Manual surveys go stale; machine-reported inventory shows servers as they are added.",
   "controls": "Microsoft documents local AI agent discovery, generally available on Windows and macOS in October 2026, that reports each agent's configured MCP servers in Defender for Endpoint. | Snyk says Evo ADS MCP Governance discovers MCP servers across the estate, and Cisco's DefenseClaw 1.0.0 notes list a per-item MCP inventory; compare coverage against your clients before choosing. | Register risks: R-07.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/whats-new-in-microsoft-defender-endpoint https://snyk.io/blog/evo-ads-govern-agent-behavior-ga/ https://github.com/cisco-ai-defense/defenseclaw/releases/tag/1.0.0"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-05",
   "category": "Discover",
   "name": "Find remote and HTTP MCP endpoints on your network",
   "what": "List MCP servers that listen on a port or are hosted for team use, and who can reach them.",
   "impact": "A server listening on all interfaces, or without authentication, serves its tools to the network.",
   "controls": "Check for MCP servers bound to 0.0.0.0 on developer subnets and for hosted servers in cloud accounts. | Record each endpoint's authentication method. | Register risks: R-09, R-17.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/transports/streamable-http https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-06",
   "category": "Discover",
   "name": "Assign an owner and review date to each server",
   "what": "Give every server in the inventory a named owner, a purpose and a date by which it is re-reviewed.",
   "impact": "Servers without an owner are never patched or removed.",
   "controls": "Keep owner, purpose, version and next review in the catalog record. | Remove servers whose owner cannot be found. | Register risks: R-07.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security https://snyk.io/blog/evo-ads-govern-agent-behavior-ga/"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-07",
   "category": "Discover",
   "name": "Compare the inventory with the approved catalog on a schedule",
   "what": "Diff what is installed against what is approved and report the difference to the owners.",
   "impact": "New and unapproved servers appear continuously; drift left unchecked becomes the norm.",
   "controls": "Run the comparison weekly and report new servers by machine and team. | Track servers that changed version since approval. | Register risks: R-07, R-05.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://snyk.io/blog/evo-ads-govern-agent-behavior-ga/ https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-08",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Verify the publisher and the exact package name",
   "what": "Check the name, publisher and repository against the vendor's own documentation before the first install.",
   "impact": "Look-alike and repackaged packages differ from the real one by a character or an address.",
   "controls": "Compare the package name letter by letter with the vendor's documented install command. | Check the publisher account, repository link and release history. | Register risks: R-01, R-02.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://www.knostic.ai/blog/repackaged-amazon-sp-api-mcp-sends-app-secrets-to-an-undisclosed-ip"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-09",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Diff the code against the upstream project",
   "what": "For a server that copies an open-source project, compare it with upstream for changed endpoints and authentication code.",
   "impact": "Knostic described a package that copied Amazon's code and replaced the authentication and API addresses.",
   "controls": "Search the code for hardcoded hosts and for changes to token or API endpoints. | Reject packages whose README does not account for the differences. | Register risks: R-02, R-03.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://www.knostic.ai/blog/repackaged-amazon-sp-api-mcp-sends-app-secrets-to-an-undisclosed-ip https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-10",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Review every field of each tool definition",
   "what": "Read the descriptions, parameter names, types, defaults, output schemas and annotations of every tool.",
   "impact": "The model reads all of these, and instructions can sit in any of them.",
   "controls": "Look for text that tells the agent to read credentials, call other tools or hide actions from the user. | Run a scanner built for tool definitions as a second check; the OWASP cheat sheet names mcp-scan. | Register risks: R-23, R-25, R-26.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://www.knostic.ai/blog/when-an-mcp-tool-asks-for-your-github-token https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/ai-tool-poisoning/"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-11",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Scan the server's dependencies",
   "what": "Run dependency scanning on the server and review known vulnerabilities and maintenance state.",
   "impact": "A vulnerable dependency runs with the server's permissions.",
   "controls": "Scan lockfiles and container images; track advisories for the servers and SDKs you approve. | Prefer servers with a documented update path. | Register risks: R-04.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://snyk.io/blog/evo-ads-govern-agent-behavior-ga/"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-12",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Check the SDK version against current advisories",
   "what": "Find which MCP SDK the server uses and compare it with the advisories published in October 2026.",
   "impact": "SDK flaws affect every server built on the affected versions.",
   "controls": "Compare with the TypeScript SDK advisories (sdk 1.32.0 and server 2.3.0 are the fixed versions named) and the Python SDK advisories (mcp 1.30.0 and 2.2.0). | Check the fix needs a setting: GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 says upgrading alone changes nothing until the audience check is turned on. | Register risks: R-08, R-11, R-15, R-21.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm63-cq47-j5jp https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-13",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Test the server in a sandbox with network capture",
   "what": "Run the candidate server in a disposable environment and record its files touched and hosts contacted.",
   "impact": "Behavior on first run shows whether the server does only what it says.",
   "controls": "Use a container or virtual machine with no real credentials and log outbound connections. | Use the MCP Inspector to list tools and review definitions; keep it on a current release. | Register risks: R-29, R-22, R-35.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tools/inspector/security"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-14",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Review the launch manifest and environment variables",
   "what": "Read the server's manifest or server.json entry and every environment variable it asks for.",
   "impact": "Variables such as NODE_OPTIONS or a registry setting change how the runtime behaves.",
   "controls": "Reject entries with unexplained environment variables or runtime-control variables. | Inspector 2.15.0 flags NODE_OPTIONS and npm_config_registry in its server.json preview; use it as a model for your own review. | Register risks: R-30, R-03.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/releases/tag/2.15.0 https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/releases/tag/2.14.0"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-15",
   "category": "Vet",
   "name": "Record the decision and pin the approved version",
   "what": "Store the approval with reviewer, date, version and a hash of the tool definitions.",
   "impact": "Without a pin, an approval does not describe tomorrow's server.",
   "controls": "Pin the package version and record the hash of the full tool definition. | Do not use registry listings as the approval; key entries by name and version. | Register risks: R-05, R-06.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases/tag/v1.8.8"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-16",
   "category": "Authenticate",
   "name": "Require authentication on every HTTP MCP endpoint",
   "what": "Make each remote or HTTP-exposed server refuse requests without valid credentials.",
   "impact": "The protocol makes authorization optional; a server that skips it serves anyone who reaches it.",
   "controls": "Test that a request with no token and one with an arbitrary token are both refused. | Place the server on loopback or a private network unless authentication is in place. | Register risks: R-09.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wrhw-j3f9-8vc6"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-17",
   "category": "Authenticate",
   "name": "Validate the audience of every access token",
   "what": "Reject tokens that were not issued for this server, using the resource indicator the client sent.",
   "impact": "A token for another service must not work here.",
   "controls": "Check the aud claim against your server's canonical URI (RFC 8707), as the authorization spec requires. | Turn on the SDK's audience setting (for example validate_token_resource in the Python SDK) after upgrading. | Register risks: R-08.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-18",
   "category": "Authenticate",
   "name": "Never forward the received token downstream",
   "what": "Obtain a separate token for each upstream API instead of passing the client's token on.",
   "impact": "Passing tokens through breaks audit trails and lets controls be bypassed.",
   "controls": "Review code paths that call upstream APIs for pass-through of the Authorization header. | Log the identity of the caller and the upstream identity separately. | Register risks: R-08, R-10.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-19",
   "category": "Authenticate",
   "name": "Use narrow scopes and a credential per server",
   "what": "Request the minimum scopes per tool, and give each server its own credential.",
   "impact": "One shared or broad token turns one flaw into access to everything it covers.",
   "controls": "Prefer short-lived tokens over long-lived personal access tokens. | Review the scopes a server requests during vetting and refuse broad ones. | Register risks: R-12, R-36.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-20",
   "category": "Authenticate",
   "name": "Bind stored credentials to their issuer",
   "what": "Make clients refuse to send saved credentials to an authorization server other than the one that issued them.",
   "impact": "Credentials sent to a server-named authorization server can be collected by that server.",
   "controls": "Pass expectedIssuer or issuer where your SDK provides it, and clear credentials saved without one. | Reject authorization server metadata whose issuer does not match the expected origin. | Register risks: R-11, R-14.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vqqp-x5qm-5qp4 https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/releases/tag/v2.2.0"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-21",
   "category": "Authenticate",
   "name": "Require per-client consent on MCP proxy servers",
   "what": "If you run an MCP proxy to a third-party API, store consent per user and per client and match redirect URIs exactly.",
   "impact": "Without per-client consent a proxy can be used to obtain authorization codes without approval.",
   "controls": "Validate the OAuth state parameter and set consent cookies with the __Host- prefix, Secure, HttpOnly and SameSite=Lax. | Prefer Client ID Metadata Documents; Dynamic Client Registration is deprecated in 2026-07-28. | Register risks: R-10, R-14.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/authorization"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-22",
   "category": "Authenticate",
   "name": "Store tokens in the operating system credential store",
   "what": "Keep access and refresh tokens in Keychain, Credential Manager or Secret Service, not in config files or plaintext.",
   "impact": "Files with loose permissions give tokens to any local reader.",
   "controls": "Check where each client and server writes tokens; the Inspector's docs say its fallback is a plaintext file when no keychain exists. | Set owner-only permissions on any file that must hold a secret. | Register risks: R-37.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tools/inspector/security https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g5xv-mhgm-v5f6"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-23",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Allow only approved servers through managed settings",
   "what": "Push an allow list of servers to clients so unapproved servers do not load.",
   "impact": "A catalog that clients do not enforce is only advice.",
   "controls": "VS Code Copilot enterprise-managed settings use allowedMcpServers and deniedMcpServers; an empty allowedMcpServers list blocks all servers and deny rules win over the allow list. | Claude Code supports managed-mcp.json for a fixed server set and allowedMcpServers and deniedMcpServers for restriction. | Register risks: R-01, R-07, R-33.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/enterprise/ai-settings https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-24",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Keep project servers from approving themselves",
   "what": "Do not enable all project-scoped servers automatically, and require approval for servers that arrive in a repository.",
   "impact": "A cloned repository can carry configuration chosen by its author.",
   "controls": "Leave enableAllProjectMcpServers unset or false in Claude Code and review each project server; Claude Code ignores such approvals committed to the project in an untrusted folder. | Use the client's workspace trust prompts. | Register risks: R-33, R-30.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-25",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Run local servers in a sandbox",
   "what": "Run each local server in a container or sandbox with minimal filesystem and network access.",
   "impact": "A local server otherwise has everything the user account has.",
   "controls": "Mount only the directories the server needs and drop network access unless required. | Note that a bare chroot is not a sandbox, per the OWASP cheat sheet. | Register risks: R-29, R-32.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-26",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Start servers with a minimal environment",
   "what": "Pass each server only the variables it needs instead of the whole shell environment.",
   "impact": "Servers inherit the environment of the process that starts them.",
   "controls": "Build the environment explicitly in the launch config. | Use separate credentials per server. | Register risks: R-36.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-27",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Bind local HTTP servers to loopback and check Origin and Host",
   "what": "Listen on 127.0.0.1, validate Origin and answer an invalid one with 403, and allow-list Host values.",
   "impact": "These checks close the DNS rebinding route to local services.",
   "controls": "Follow the Streamable HTTP spec's security requirements for Origin and binding. | Prefer stdio or a Unix socket with restricted permissions for local servers. | Register risks: R-16, R-17.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/transports/streamable-http https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/releases/tag/2.12.0"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-28",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Restrict outbound network access from servers",
   "what": "Allow only the destinations a server needs, and route server-side fetches through an egress proxy.",
   "impact": "Blocked egress stops credential and data exfiltration and SSRF reaching internal hosts.",
   "controls": "Block private, loopback and link-local ranges for fetches driven by URLs from servers or models; use a maintained library. | Alert on connections to destinations outside the allow list. | Register risks: R-22, R-18.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-29",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Require confirmation for sensitive tool calls",
   "what": "Show full parameters and ask for approval for destructive, financial and data-sharing operations, and never auto-approve in multi-server setups.",
   "impact": "Approvals are the control that sits between injected text and an action.",
   "controls": "Use your own policy per tool rather than the server's annotations, which clients must treat as untrusted. | Make sure model-generated text cannot satisfy the confirmation. | Register risks: R-34, R-26, R-27.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/server/tools"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-30",
   "category": "Constrain",
   "name": "Check URLs before a client opens them",
   "what": "In clients you build, allow only http and https for authorization URLs and open them without a shell.",
   "impact": "Server-supplied URLs reach the operating system's opener.",
   "controls": "Reject javascript:, data:, file: and other schemes using an allow list. | Do not use cmd.exe, sh or PowerShell to open a URL. | Register risks: R-31, R-18.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/releases/tag/2.12.0"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-31",
   "category": "Observe",
   "name": "Log every tool call with its parameters",
   "what": "Record the tool, parameters, user and time for each invocation.",
   "impact": "Without records an incident cannot be reconstructed.",
   "controls": "Capture the same fields for every client. | Keep the logs long enough for your investigation window. | Register risks: R-40.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/basic/security_best_practices"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-32",
   "category": "Observe",
   "name": "Redact secrets and personal data in logs",
   "what": "Mask credentials and personal data in parameters and results before they are stored.",
   "impact": "Logs otherwise become a second store of secrets.",
   "controls": "Test redaction with sample credentials. | Restrict log access and set retention. | Register risks: R-41.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-33",
   "category": "Observe",
   "name": "Alert when tool definitions change",
   "what": "Compare tool definitions with the pinned hash and alert on any difference, including annotation changes.",
   "impact": "A changed definition is the signal of a rug pull.",
   "controls": "Re-prompt for consent on change. | Alert on listChanged notifications from servers not expected to change. | Register risks: R-05, R-26.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2026-07-28/server/tools"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-34",
   "category": "Observe",
   "name": "Alert on new servers, destinations and cross-server data flows",
   "what": "Watch for unapproved servers appearing, new outbound hosts and one server's values showing up in another's calls.",
   "impact": "These patterns mark shadowing, exfiltration and unknown installs.",
   "controls": "Add detections for new tools called, unusual call rates and admin-level queries. | Feed alerts to the same queue as other security alerts. | Register risks: R-24, R-38, R-22, R-07.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html https://snyk.io/blog/evo-ads-govern-agent-behavior-ga/"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-35",
   "category": "Observe",
   "name": "Send MCP logs to the SIEM",
   "what": "Forward tool-call logs to the system your responders already use.",
   "impact": "Detection only works if the logs reach the people who can act.",
   "controls": "Use a common schema across clients. | Map fields to user and device identity. | Register risks: R-40.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-36",
   "category": "Observe",
   "name": "Track advisories for approved components",
   "what": "Subscribe to GitHub advisories and release notes for every server and SDK in the catalog.",
   "impact": "Fixes such as the October 2026 SDK advisories only matter if someone reads them.",
   "controls": "Map each advisory to catalog entries and owners. | Record the date the fix was deployed. | Register risks: R-04, R-13.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rvq5-wwqv-78pq https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/releases/tag/v2.2.0"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-37",
   "category": "Respond",
   "name": "Write a procedure to remove a server everywhere",
   "what": "Define how to take a server out of the managed allow list and remove it from configurations.",
   "impact": "Speed matters once a server is found malicious.",
   "controls": "Remove it from the allowed list first, then from config files and caches. | Test the procedure on a harmless server. | Register risks: R-07.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/enterprise/ai-settings https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-38",
   "category": "Respond",
   "name": "Rotate credentials the server could read",
   "what": "List the credentials in the server's environment and files and rotate them.",
   "impact": "Knostic's SP-API finding involves credentials sent to a hardcoded address; rotation limits the damage.",
   "controls": "Rotate tokens, keys and refresh tokens that the server held. | Revoke sessions at the authorization server. | Register risks: R-36, R-02.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://www.knostic.ai/blog/repackaged-amazon-sp-api-mcp-sends-app-secrets-to-an-undisclosed-ip https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/tutorials/security/local-server-security"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-39",
   "category": "Respond",
   "name": "Preserve logs and a copy of the package",
   "what": "Keep tool-call logs and the exact package version for analysis.",
   "impact": "Registries remove malicious packages, and evidence goes with them.",
   "controls": "Save the package, its hash and the config that launched it. | Export logs for the period the server was active. | Register risks: R-40.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-40",
   "category": "Respond",
   "name": "Find affected machines from the inventory",
   "what": "Use the inventory to list every machine and user running the server or the affected version.",
   "impact": "Scope decides how many credentials to rotate.",
   "controls": "Query by package name and version. | Include project-scoped configs. | Register risks: R-07.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://snyk.io/blog/evo-ads-govern-agent-behavior-ga/ https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/whats-new-in-microsoft-defender-endpoint"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-41",
   "category": "Respond",
   "name": "Patch and apply the settings that upgrades do not turn on",
   "what": "Upgrade affected servers and SDKs, then enable settings the fix needs.",
   "impact": "Some advisories say upgrading alone changes nothing.",
   "controls": "Check the advisory text for required settings such as the audience check or expectedIssuer. | Re-test after the change. | Register risks: R-08, R-11.",
   "severity": "high",
   "sources": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w4fh-qvv9-3v23 https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6qxp-vccf-f47h"
  },
  {
   "id": "C-42",
   "category": "Respond",
   "name": "Update vetting rules after each incident",
   "what": "Add what you learned to the vetting checks and catalog rules.",
   "impact": "Each incident shows a gap in review.",
   "controls": "Record the cause and the control that would have caught it. | Update the checklist edition and note the date. | Register risks: R-06.",
   "severity": "medium",
   "sources": "https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/MCP_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html"
  }
 ]
}
